Michael Sutter v. Stan Benson : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
Michael Sutter v. Stan Benson : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brian P. Miller; Kenneth L. Reich; Ryan B. Bell; Snow, Christensen and Matineau; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Richard M. Hutchins; Michele P. Chambers; Richard M. Hutchins and Assoc.; Attorneys for
Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Sutter v. Benson, No. 20040483 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5029
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL SUTTER, 
Plaintiff/Appellant. 
vs. 
STAN BENSON, M.D., 
Defendant/ Appellee. 
CaseNo.20040483-CA 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY THE 
HONORABLE G. RAND BEACHAM. FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR'; 
RICHARD M. HUTCHINS (5573) 
MICHELE P. CHAMBERS (7481) 
RICHARD M. HUTCHINS & ASSOC. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
192 Fast 2C0 North, #102 
St.. George, Utah 84770 
Tel: (435)674-9000 
BRIAN P. MILLER (6933) 
KENNETH L. REICH (8578) 
RYAN B. BELL (9956) 
SNOW. CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84145 
Tel: (801)521-9000 
UT
*H COURT OF
 A P P E A t -
BRIEF 
:NT 
•A10 
Do
^ETNo.^toy 
FILED 
TAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAR 2 I 2005 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL SUTTER, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, Case No. 20040483-CA 
vs. 
STAN BENSON, M.D., 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY THE 
HONORABLE G. RAND BEACHAM, FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
RICHARD M. HUTCHINS (5573) 
MICHELE P. CHAMBERS (7481) 
RICHARD M. HUTCHINS & ASSOC. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
192 East 200 North, #102 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Tel: (435)674-9000 
BRIAN P. MILLER (6933) 
KENNETH L. REICH (8578) 
RYAN B. BELL (9956) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Tel: (801)521-9000 
I. ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Appellee Stan Benson, M.D. (hereinafter referred to as "Dr. Benson") requests oral 
argument because of the important issues this appeal implicates. 
II. LIST OF PARTIES 
All parties involved in this appeal are identified in the caption. 
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V. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-
2(4). 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the district court properly determine that Sutter's first filed complaint 
was dismissed as of the date that the court was presented with and accepted a signed 
stipulation of voluntary dismissal, granted the dismissal, and entered a minute entry 
record of the dismissal? 
2. Did the district court properly determine that when the statute of limitations 
on Sutter's claim had expired and Sutter relied on the savings statute to refile his claim, 
that the tolling provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act extending the 
"applicable statute of limitation" did not toll the time allowed by the savings statute for 
Sutter to refile his complaint? 
Standard of review: Because both issues concern the lower court's summary 
judgment order, the standard of review is the same for both issues: 
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Norman 
v. Arnold, 2002 UT 81, TJ15, 57 P.3d 997; Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
This Court "give[s] a trial court's decision to grant summary judgment no 
deference and review[s] it for correctness." Norman, 2002 UT 81 at ^ [15. 
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This Court "view[s] the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. at %L. 
"The proper interpretation of a statute is [] a question of law, which we review for 
correctness." Toone v. Weber County, 2002 UT 103, 57 P.3d 1079. 
VII. DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES 
The following rules and statutory provisions are of central importance to the 
outcome of this appeal and are attached in their entirety in the Addendum: 
A. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 41(a)(2). 
(a)Voluntary Dismissal; effect thereof; (a)(2) By order of 
court. Unless the plaintiff timely files a notice of dismissal 
under paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action 
may only be dismissed at the request of the plaintiff on order 
of the court based either on: (a)(2)(i) a stipulation of all of the 
parties who have appeared in the action; or (ii) upon such 
terms and conditions as the court deems proper. 
B. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 7(f)(1). 
"An order includes every direction of the court including a minute 
order entered in writing, not included in a judgment." 
C. Utah Code Annotated Section 78-14-12(3)(a). 
The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review under 
this section tolls the applicable statute of limitation until the 
earlier of 60 days following the division's issuance of an 
opinion by the prelitigation panel, or 60 days following the 
termination of jurisdiction by the division as provided in this 
subsection.... 
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D. Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-40. 
Effect of failure of action not on merits. If any action is 
commenced within due time and a judgment thereon for the 
plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such action or 
upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the merits, and the 
time limited either by law or contract for commencing the 
same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies and the 
cause of action survives, his representatives, may commence a 
new action within one year after the reversal or failure. 
VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below. 
This is a medical malpractice action brought under the provisions of the Health 
Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Annotated Section 78-14-1, et. seq. Appellant Michael 
Sutter (hereinafter referred to as "Sutter") first filed his complaint on September 23, 1999. 
Sutter then filed a stipulation to voluntarily dismiss the complaint without prejudice on 
April 19, 2000. The district court granted dismissal on April 20, 2000. Sutter later refilled 
the complaint on April 23, 2001. On May 4, 2004, the Court entered an order granting 
Dr. Benson's Motion for Summary Judgment, and dismissing the complaint as untimely. 
Sutter now appeals from the district court's Order of Summary Judgment. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. On or about May 26, 1997, Sutter presented to the emergency department at 
Dixie Regional Medical Center ("Dixie") for treatment of a large swollen mass in his 
right arm. R. 2. 
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2. Attempting to drain the apparent abscess, Dr. Benson made a small incision 
on its surface. The incision revealed a ruptured brachial artery. Consequently, later on 
May 26, 1997, Sutter underwent surgery to repair the artery. R. 2. 
3. Sutter claims that as a result of Dr. Benson's incision and subsequent 
surgery on May 26, 1997, he suffered personal injury, incurred medical expenses, lost 
wages and other benefits of employment, suffered pain and anguish of mind and body, 
and sustained permanent disfigurement. R. 2. 
4. On May 26, 1999, the last day in which to initiate an action against Dr. 
Benson prior to the running of the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice 
actions and pursuant to the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act ("Malpractice Act"), Utah 
Code Annotated Section 78-14-8, Sutter mailed a Notice of Intent to Commence Action 
to Dr. Benson. R. 44. 
5. Because Sutter's Notice of Intent was served less than ninety days prior to 
the expiration of the statute of limitations, Sutter's time for commencing his malpractice 
action was extended 120 days from the date of service of the Notice of Intent. As a result, 
Sutter's statute of limitations in which to commence his malpractice action was extended 
to September 23, 1999. R. 92. 
6. Thereafter, however, Sutter failed to file a request for prelitigation hearing 
with DOPL, as required by the Malpractice Act, Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-12. 
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7. On September 22, 1999, apparently believing that he had complied with the 
prelitigation requirements of the Malpractice Act, Sutter filed a complaint naming Dr. 
Benson. Dixie was served with a summons and the complaint. Dr. Benson was not 
served with a summons or complaint. R. 85. 
8. Dixie moved to dismiss the complaint based upon Sutter's failure to comply 
with the prelitigation requirements of the Malpractice Act. Sutter thereafter apparently 
realized that he had failed to file a request for prelitigation hearing and that he did not 
have the required certificate of compliance from DOPL in order to proceed. R. 92. 
9. On April 19, 2000, Sutter filed a "Stipulation of Dismissal (without 
prejudice)" signed by Sutter's attorney and Brinton Burbidge, counsel for Dixie Regional 
Medical Center. R 105. 
10. On April 20, 2000, the district court held a hearing on Dixie's Motion to 
Dismiss and entered Sutter's stipulated dismissal of the complaint without prejudice, 
stating that "[t]here being no one present [at this hearing] and a Stipulation to Dismiss 
(Without Prejudice) being filed. Court orders this matter dismissed." R. 108. 
11. On April 24, 2000, the district court's clerk made a computer entry 
containing the phrase "Case disposition is dismsd w/o prejudice." R. 108. 
12. On May 9, 2000, Sutter mailed his Second Notice of Intent to Dr. Benson. 
R.46. 
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13. On May 11, 2000, Sutter then filed a request for prelitigation panel review. 
R.48. 
14. On September 21, 2000, a prelitigation hearing was held. R. 51. 
15. On November 15, 2000, the prelitigation panel issued its opinion. R. 51. 
16. On November 16, 2000, DOPL issued a certificate of compliance to Sutter. 
R. 53. 
17. April 20, 2001, according to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40, was the deadline 
for Sutter to refile his complaint. R. 79 
18. On April 23, 2001, Sutter refiled his complaint against defendants. R. 3. 
19. A time line summarizing the significant events of the case was presented to 
the district court. R. 91 . 
20. On February 11, 2003, Dr. Benson filed his Motion for Summary Judgment 
on the basis that Sutter's claims were barred as out of time. The motion was fully briefed 
by the parties and the district court held a hearing on the matter on May 22, 2003. R. 114. 
21. At the hearing, the district court granted Dr. Benson's motion and 
ultimately entered the Order Granting Stan Benson, M.D.'s Motion for Summary 
Judgment (the "Summary Judgment Order") that is at issue in this matter. In the 
Summary Judgment Order, the district court made, among others, the following findings: 
Plaintiff claims that the date of dismissal of his first 
Complaint, Civil No. 990501775, was effective April 24, 
2000, the date on which a clerk's computer entry of the fact of 
dismissal was apparently made. Dismissal did not occur on 
April 24, 2000, but occurred on April 20, 2000, according to 
the minute entry which documented the Court's order of 
dismissal rendered from the bench at the hearing on the same 
date at which no party or attorney appeared. The clerk's 
computer entry of the fact of dismissal may have been made 
on April 24, 2000, but that did not constitute the dismissal of 
Civil No. 990501775, the dismissal having already occurred 
on April 20, 2000. 
R. 116. 
IX. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Sutter first filed his complaint before fulfilling all of the Malpractice Act 
prelitigation requirements and subsequently stipulated to the voluntary dismissal of the 
complaint. The district court granted the stipulated dismissal of the complaint and 
entered its order of dismissal and noted it on a minute entry record. These actions qualify 
as an order, under the definition provided in Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(1). According to Utah 
R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), to grant a motion for voluntary dismissal a court need only order the 
case dismissed, nothing more. Thus, the Court's order on April 20, 2000, dismissing the 
complaint, was effective on that date. Because Sutter refiled his complaint more than a 
year after April 20, 2000, his claims are barred. 
Sutter's cited cases are irrelevant, since they all focus on the sufficiency of a final 
judgment for purposes of appeal. The instant case differs from these cases in that the 
voluntary dismissal was non-appealable, and was memorialized in the parties' submitted 
stipulation. 
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Finally, the savings statute is not a statute of limitations, and cannot be tolled. 
Therefore, the deadline under the savings statute for Sutter to refile his complaint was 
April 20, 2001. Having missed that deadline, Sutter is barred from filing his complaint. 
X. ARGUMENT 
A. The Court's Ruling and Minute Entry Dismissing Plaintiffs 
Lawsuit Based on Stipulation of the Parties Was an Order of 
Dismissal and Required No Further Action from the Court or 
Parties. 
Sutter's complaint was dismissed on April 20, 2000. On that date, the district 
court held a hearing to consider Dixie's Motion to Dismiss. The Court was presented 
with, and accepted, a stipulated order of dismissal signed by counsel for all the parties 
and agreeing to dismissal of Sutter's complaint without prejudice. The district court 
granted the motion, and entered its order. As detailed below, these acts were wholly 
sufficient to effect the dismissal of Sutter's complaint. There was no longer a case 
pending before the district court as of April 20, 2000. Sutter's citation to cases 
concerning the sufficiency of final judgments for purposes of appeal are irrelevant and are 
not helpful to the issues relevant in this case. 
1. A voluntary dismissal is granted when an order issues, not when a 
final appealable judgment is entered. 
Rule 41(a)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the requirements for a 
plaintiff to dismiss his or her pending lawsuit: " . . .[A]n action may only be dismissed at 
the request of the plaintiff on order of the court based either on a (i) stipulation of all of 
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the parties who have appeared in the action, or (ii)upon such terms and conditions as the 
court deems proper . . ." Utah R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). Here, Sutter presented to the district 
court a signed stipulation for dismissal signed by counsel for all the parties. The Court 
ordered the dismissal based on the stipulation and, thus, by operation of Rule 41, the case 
was dismissed. 
Rule 41 does not require an entry of judgment, nor does it require any written 
document. For the purposes of a Rule 41 voluntary dismissal, when a stipulation of all of 
the parties is submitted to the court, a case will be dismissed "on order of the court." All 
that remains, then, is to define what is meant by "order of the court." Here, the district 
court's ruling from the bench in open court, followed by an entry of the ruling in the 
court's minutes, constitutes an "order" for purposes of Rule 41. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(1) provides the following: "An order includes every direction 
of the court, including a minute order entered in writing, not included in a judgment." 
(emphasis added). Read together with Rule 41(a)(2), an order of the court dismissing the 
case occurred when the district court accepted the stipulation, declared at the hearing that 
Sutter's complaint was dismissed, and entered that ruling in the docket. As these events 
took place on April 20, 2000, Sutter's complaint was dismissed on that day. Because the 
dismissal was without prejudice, by operation of the savings statute, Sutter then had until 
April 20, 2001, one year later to refile his complaint. Instead, he waited until April 24, 
2001. This delay is fatal to his claim and the district court's order should be affirmed. 
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2. Sutter's Case Citations Are Inapposite, as They Deal 
with "Judgment" for Purposes of Appeal. 
Sutter cites numerous cases analyzing the requirements for entry of judgment and 
appeal. He fails to cite cases addressing what is required when a case is voluntarily 
dismissed. Cases that seek clarification on the necessary components of a final, 
appealable judgment are not helpful to the present case, because a judgment is not the 
same as an order based on a stipulation to voluntarily dismiss a case. Rule 54(a), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, states that "'[jjudgment' as used in these rules includes a decree 
and any order from which an appeal lies." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(a). Under this definition, 
an order of voluntary dismissal is not a judgment, as no appeal lies from a case that has 
been voluntarily dismissed. See Bowers v. Utah Transit Auth., 872 P.2d 1036, 1039 
(Utah 1994); see also Dove v. Cude, 710 P.2d 170 (Utah 1985) ("parties are bound by 
their stipulations . . . . " ) . 
Given the difference between a judgment and an order of dismissal based on the 
stipulation of the parties, Sutter's voluminous case citations are not helpful. Without 
exception, each case cited by Sutter in support of his "no final judgment" argument deals 
with the sufficiency of a judgment for purposes of appeal. In each of these cases, a Utah 
court found that a district court's unsigned minute entry or statement from the bench does 
not constitute a final judgment for purposes of appeal. See Ron Shepherd Insurance v. 
Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 653 (Utah 1994) (finding that court's minute entry did not 
constitute a "final judgment for purposes of appeal."); Watson v. Odell, 176 P. 619, 619 
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(Utah 1918) (". . . an order similar to the one [in the instant case] is not a final and 
appealable judgment.5'); father v. Gross, 727 P.2d 212, 213 (Utah 1986) ("An appeal 
can be taken only from the entry of a final judgment that concludes the action.") 
(emphasis added in all). 
The focus on a "final judgment for purposes of appeal" has no bearing on the 
instant case. Appeals courts insist on a final judgment in order to ground an appeal, 
because a final judgment "specifies with certainty a final determination of the rights of 
the parties and is susceptible of enforcement." Swenson Assoc. Architects, v. State, 889 
P.2d 415, 417 (Utah 1994) (citing Cannon v. Keller, 692 P.2d 740, 741 n.l (Utah 1984)). 
This policy associated with requiring a final written judgment is inapplicable here for two 
reasons. First, in the instant case, there is a document specifying with certainty a final 
determination of the rights of the parties- that is, the stipulation submitted and signed by 
the parties, which clearly states that the case should be dismissed without prejudice. If 
any appeal from the voluntary dismissal were possible, an appellate court could easily rely 
on the signed stipulation as a record of the disposition of the case. See R. 105. Second, 
even if no such document existed, it could never be expected that a voluntary dismissal 
would be appealed, given that it was agreed to by all the parties. Further, such dismissals 
are never appealed because, under the savings statute, plaintiffs are enabled to refile their 
claims, if they will do so within the liberal one-year period following dismissal. 
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The non-appealability of the stipulated dismissal eliminates the need for a final 
entry of judgment. Given that all parties agreed to the dismissal, and they themselves 
drafted a document detailing and memorializing the agreement, no final entry of judgment 
was needed, and the district court's order sufficed to dismiss the complaint. 
Many of Sutter's cited cases are inapposite for another reason. They focus on 
situations where a court has ruled on a motion, recorded the ruling in its minutes, and 
explicitly stated that a final written order was forthcoming. See Swenson, supra, 889 P.2d 
415 (Utah 1994); Watson, supra, 176 P. 619 (Utah 1918); State v. Jiminez, 938 P.2d 264 
(Utah 1997); Wilson v. Manning, 645 P.2 655 (Utah 1982). When the rulings in these 
cases were appealed, each was dismissed because the notice of appeal had been filed 
before the final order was entered. It makes sense that when a district court makes a 
ruling stating that a future order will be signed, no appeal can lie from the initial ruling. 
The present case does not fit into this category of cases, because the district court made 
no indication any further order would be issued or required. The district court, in fact, 
intended that the complaint be dismissed by stipulation and meant for its minute entry to 
be its dismissal order on the case. In its ruling on Dr. Benson's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the district court stated that the case was dismissed on April 20, 2000-
evidencing its own intention to dismiss that case with its minute entry order. R. 116. In 
the absence of some reason to expect some other word from the court on the voluntary 
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dismissal stipulation and motion, the district court's minute entry serves as a final order 
on the matter. 
3. Even If a Final Judgment for Purposes of Appeal Were 
Required Here, the Court's Minute Entry Would 
Suffice. 
Sutter cites a bevy of cases meant to convince the court that no decision can be 
honored if recorded only in a court's minutes. This is assuredly not the case. Several 
Utah cases exist in which courts have heard appeals from decisions rendered in minute 
entries alone. In Dove v. Cude, the Supreme Court took up the issue of whether it could 
hear an appeal from a district court's grant of a motion to withdraw a stipulation, which 
was recorded as a minute entry. 710 P.2d 170, 171 n. 1 (Utah 1985). The Court 
determined that the minute entry constituted a final order, reasoning that "[b]y permitting 
withdrawal of the stipulation, the district court determined the rights of the parties in this 
case." Id. 
In Mcnair v. Hayward, the Supreme Court heard an appeal from a denial of a 
criminal defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus. 666 P.2d 321, 325 n.l (Utah 
1984). In reviewing the history of the case, the Court noted multiple motions to dismiss, 
which had all been denied by minute entries. The Court held that each of these denials 
was a final order for purposes of appeal. Id. 
The test for determining when a court's decision can be treated as a final order was 
elaborated in Cannon v. Keller, 692 P.2d 740 (Utah 1984). See Dove, 710 P.2d at 171 
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n. 1; Swenson, 889 P.2d at 417. The Cannon Court was faced with whether to hear an 
appeal from a lower court's memorandum decision ordering a party to disclose the 
identity of a witness to a criminal transaction. The Court decided to treat the 
memorandum decision as a final order, because "the ruling specifies with certainty a final 
determination of the rights of the parties and is susceptible of enforcement." Cannon, 
692P.2dat741 n.l. 
This test weighs in favor of treating the district court's dismissal of Sutter's 
complaint as a final order. The order made a final determination of each party's rights, as 
stated more fully in the stipulation submitted by the parties. No question remained as to 
whether the case was still active, whether either party could appeal, or whether some 
future order would issue on the matter. Every question and claim remaining in the case 
was completely resolved and disposed of in the order. Thus, there is no reason not to treat 
the district court's dismissal as a final order. 
4. Sutter Is Not Helped by His Citation to the Rules of 
Judicial Administration. 
Sutter appears to rely on Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration for 
further support of his position that the district court's order of dismissal had no effect. 
See Appellant's Brief, at 8. And yet the Rules of Judicial Administration which governed 
the case at the time of the dismissal makes specific provisions for approval of stipulated 
dismissals. Rule 4-504.01 provides: "(1) in all rulings by the court, counsel for the party 
or parties obtaining a ruling shall within fifteen days, or within a shorter time as the court 
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may direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity with 
the ruling." Utah R. Judicial Admin. 4-504.01 (repealed). Sutter suggests that the district 
court should have required one of the parties to memorialize its order by submitting a 
proposed order to be signed by the district court. This suggestion is negated, however, by 
sections (3) and (7) of the same rule: 
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be 
reduced to writing and presented to the court for 
signature within fifteen days of the settlement and 
dismissal. . . . (7) No orders, judgments, or decrees 
based upon stipulation shall be signed and entered 
unless the stipulation is in writing, signed by the 
attorneys of record for the respective parties and filed 
with the clerk or the stipulation was made on the 
record. 
Utah R. Judicial Admin, 4-504.3,7 (repealed). 
Rule 4-504 expressly outlines that stipulations for dismissal are to be handled 
differently than other kinds of orders. In the sections concerning stipulations, the sole 
requirement is that the stipulation be reduced to writing and submitted to the court soon 
after the agreement is reached. 
The district court and the parties fulfilled the requirements of Rule 4-504 perfectly. 
After reaching an agreement, the parties submitted a signed stipulation to the court, which 
the court approved and granted, recording the order in its minutes. To require yet another 
writing from the parties, restating exactly what they had already recorded in their 
stipulation, would have been nonsensical and redundant- nothing had changed since they 
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submitted the stipulation, so nothing could be added to it. The stipulation was an accurate 
depiction of the agreement between the parties, and, once approved by the court, properly 
reflected the final disposition of the case. 
Sutter has not provided this Court any reason to reject the district court's April 20, 
2000 order of dismissal. For the reasons set forth supra, the Court should affirm the 
district court's finding that Sutter's complaint was dismissed as of April 20, 2000. 
B. The Savings Statute Cannot Be Tolled by the Malpractice Act and 
Sutter's Claims Are Time-barred. 
1. When the District Court Entered Dismissal of Sutter's First 
Filed Complaint on April 20, 2000, the Statute of Limitations 
Had Already Run. 
Sutter was allegedly injured on May 26, 1997. Under Utah Code Section 78-14-
4(1), the statute allowed Sutter two years from the date of his injury to file his claim. On 
May 26, 1999, the last day Sutter could file his claim, he mailed to Dr. Benson a notice of 
intent to commence action. Because Sutter's notice of intent was served fewer than 
ninety days prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, Sutter's time for 
commencing his malpractice action was extended 120 days from the date of service of the 
notice of intent. See U.C.A. § 78-14-8. As a result, Sutter's deadline for commencing his 
malpractice action was extended to September 23, 1999. 
At no time prior to September 23, 1999 did Sutter file a request for hearing which 
would have tolled the statute of limitations during the prelitigation process had he made 
the request. Sutter, however, apparently believing that he had complied with the 
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prelitigation requirements of the Malpractice Act, Sutter filed a complaint on September 
22, 1999. Dixie Regional Medical Center, the only party served with that complaint, 
moved to dismiss it for failure to comply with the Malpractice Act's prelitigation 
requirements. The district court scheduled a hearing on the motion and the day before the 
hearing, Sutter filed a stipulation to dismiss the first filed complaint. Neither Sutter nor 
Dixie appeared at the hearing held by the district court and the court recognized and 
accepted the parties' stipulated dismissal and entered its order of dismissal by minute 
entry on April 20, 2000. 
Because the statute of limitations on his malpractice claims had already expired on 
September 23, 1999, Sutter's claims, which he voluntarily dismissed on April 20, 2000, 
were no longer timely. In order to refile his claims, Sutter turned to the savings statute, 
which applies only to those cases where "the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause 
of action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or contract for 
commencing the same shall have expired . . . . " See U.C.A § 78-12-40. Thus, Sutter's 
ability to invoke the savings statute was conditioned on the fact that the applicable statute 
of limitations had already expired. Hence, there is no question that the statute of 
limitations for the filing of Sutter's malpractice action had expired before his case was 
dismissed on April 20, 2000. 
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2. The Savings Statute Is Not a Statute of Limitations and 
Cannot Be Tolled. 
Given that the statute of limitations had expired, Sutter's only remaining option for 
refiling his complaint was the savings statute. Sutter now seeks to apply the tolling 
provisions of the Malpractice Act to toll the savings statute to accommodate his tardiness 
in refiling his complaint. The savings statute cannot be treated as a statute of limitations 
for purposes of tolling under the Malpractice Act for two reasons: First, the savings 
statute only becomes applicable when the statute of limitations has already run; and 
second, there is no legal precedence, either statutory or judicial for applying the savings 
statute as a statute of limitations. 
Under the Malpractice Act, the "applicable statute of limitations" governing the 
action is tolled during the prelitigation process when the claimant files a request for 
hearing. See U.C.A. § 78-14-12(3)(a). In order for Sutter to rely on the savings statute, 
the statute of limitations must already have run on his claims. Sutter may not now claim 
the right to refile his complaint under the savings statute and treat the savings statute as if 
it were a statute of limitation and seek to have the savings statute tolled by the 
Malpractice Act. 
The "applicable statute of limitations" governing Sutter's claims is found in the 
Malpractice Act. See U.C.A. § 78-14-4 (two-year statute of limitations). As set forth 
supra, the two-year statute of limitations applicable to Sutter's claim expired on 
September 23, 1999. 
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Sutter attempts to extricate himself from this dead end by reading the phrase 
"applicable statute of limitations" to refer to the savings statute. This reading is not 
supported in law. Sutter's disconnection from the law on this point is evidenced by his 
habit of referring to the savings statute throughout his brief as the "statute of limitations 
provided by Utah Code Section 78-12-40." See, e.g., Appellant's Brief, pp. 5, 28. 
Nothing in the statute hints that it could be or should be labeled as a "statute of 
limitation." Further, there is not a single Utah case that refers to the savings statute as a 
statute of limitation as Sutter does. On the contrary, Utah Courts are consistently careful 
to refer to the savings statute and statutes of limitations separately, even when dealing 
with both kinds of statutes in the same case. See, e.g., McBride-Williams v. Huard, 2004 
UT 21, Tfl4, 94 P.3d 175, 178 (holding that the savings statute and the Malpractice Act's 
statute of limitations, 'to the extent that they relate to one another . . . ," are motivated by 
different policy concerns); Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, 70 P.3d 1 
(writing that "savings statute suspends enforcement of statute of limitations . . ."); also 
Kittredge v. Shaddy, 2001 UT 7, 20 P.3d 285. While it is clear that these two statutes 
regularly interact, it is also clear that they are different. Rather than becoming a new, 
provisional statute of limitations, when the savings statute is activated, it "suspends 
enforcement" of the statute of limitations. Grynberg, 2003 UT at [^29, 70 P.3d at 29. 
Had the Utah State Legislature intended the Malpractice Act's tolling provisions to 
apply to the savings statute as well as to "applicable statutes of limitations," it could 
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easily have used more expansive language. Broad references to legal time constraints are 
included in other statutes. Indeed, the savings statute itself applies to cases which were 
filed "in due time," broadly including any action timely brought before the courts in its 
first instance, albeit under circumstances in which the relevant statute of limitations has 
been modified, extended, or abrogated. See, e.g., Hebertson v. Bank One, 995 P.2d 7 
(Utah Ct. App. 1999)(savings statute allowed to run serially as long as first filed and 
intermediate complaints are "in due time."). Thus, there is no question that the legislature 
is capable of drafting language as expansive as that desired by Mr. Sutter in his reading of 
the Malpractice Act. And yet, despite this capability, the drafters of the Malpractice Act 
decided to toll only the "the applicable statute of limitations." 
"In matters of statutory construction, the best evidence of the true intent and 
purpose of the Legislature in enacting [an] act is the plain language of the act." Platts v. 
Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, at 662 (Utah 1997). Given that the Legislature 
was capable of crafting the Malpractice Act's tolling provisions to apply to the savings 
statute by using expansive language similar to that in the savings statute, but chose not to, 
the plain language of the Act must be heeded. The Court, therefore, should apply the 
Malpractice Act as expressly written and limit its tolling provision only to the "applicable 
statute of limitations." 
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There is no case in which the Utah savings statute's one-year refiling period has 
ever been tolled or extended in any way.1 Indeed, there is no authority for taking such a 
step. The statute plainly reads t h a t " . . . the plaintiff... may commence a new action 
within one year after the reversal or failure." See U.C.A. § 78-12-40 (emphasis added). 
Every Utah case that has taken up the issue of the savings statute has allowed exactly one 
year to refile dismissed cases- no more and no less. This fact also lends support to the 
idea that the savings statute has never been considered to be a statute of limitations-
otherwise, cases might exist in which the savings statute had been tolled. Given the 
clarity of the statute and the lockstep approach of the Courts, Sutter's suggestion that the 
savings statute can somehow be tolled or expanded is without merit. 
C. Sutter's Failure to Refile His Malpractice Claim Within the One-
Year Period Provided Under the Savings Statute Is Fatal to His 
Claims. 
The above arguments combine to emphasize an important conclusion in this case: 
the only way Sutter could have successfully refiled his claim against Dr. Benson was to 
file a notice of intent or complaint on or before April 20, 2000. He was barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations from filing any suit after September 23, 2000. This 
meant that his only remaining option after the dismissal was the savings statute, which 
offered exactly one year in which to refile the lawsuit. Given that Sutter's case was 
'Of course, the one-year period can be used multiple times in sequence, as stated in 
Hebertson, 995 P.2d 7. But this practice simply constitutes the serial invocation of the 
statute, rather than an interruption of its mandated time period. 
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dismissed on April 20, 2000 by the Court's acceptance of the stipulated dismissal and its 
minute entry, Sutter was required to refile his case by April 20, 2001. It is undisputed that 
he failed to do so. Thus, Sutter is now completely barred from re-commencing his 
lawsuit against Dr. Benson. For these reasons, the district court's ruling of summary 
judgment was appropriate and should be affirmed by this Court. 
X. CONCLUSION 
Sutter has consistently made filings in this matter at the very limits of the time 
allotted him. Having skirted the edge numerous times, Sutter made his final filing three 
days too late. As a result, the district court appropriately granted summary judgment in 
favor of Dr. Benson. In so ruling, the district court determined that its dismissal of 
Sutter's first-filed complaint occurred on April 20, 2000 and that Sutter's second-filed 
complaint was untimely under both a statute of limitations analysis and savings statute 
analysis. Finally, the district court correctly held that Sutter could not extend the savings 
statute beyond one year by reliance on the Malpractice Act's tolling provisions that 
specifically apply only to the "applicable statute of limitation." For these reasons and 
those set forth herein, Dr. Benson respectfully requests the Court affirm summary 
judgment in his favor. 
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DATED this 3- ' day of March, 2005. 
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By_ 
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Stan Benson, M.D. 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 41 
allure of party to attend at own deposition or serve 
r to interrogatories or respond to request for inspection. 
ty or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party 
son designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify 
If of a party fails (1) to appear before the officer who is 
,he deposition, after being served with a proper notice, 
serve answers or objections to interrogatories submit-
*r Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, 
serve a written response to a request for inspection 
3d under Rule 34, after proper service of the request, 
t in which the action is pending on motion may make 
lers in regard to the failure as are just, and among 
, may take any action authorized under Paragraphs 
and (C) of Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of any 
in addition thereto, the court shall require the party 
o act or the party's attorney or both to pay the 
>le expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the 
mless the court finds that the failure was substan-
tified or that other circumstances make an award of 
unjust. 
dure to act described in this subdivision may not be 
>n the ground that the discovery sought is objection-
ss the party failing to act has applied for a protective 
provided by Rule 26(c). 
lure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. 
r or attorney fails to participate in good faith in the 
)f a discovery plan by agreement as is required by 
f), the court may, after opportunity for hearing, 
uch party or attorney to pay to any other party the 
e expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the 
'ure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, 
or other material as required by Rule 26(a) or Rules 
r to amend a prior response to discovery as required 
6(e)(2), that party shall not be permitted to use the 
ocument or other material at any hearing unless the 
disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause 
ilure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this 
the court may order any other sanction, including 
of reasonable costs and attorney fees, any order 
under subpart (b)(2)(A), (B) or (C) and informing the 
1
 failure to disclose. 
PART VI. TRIALS 
Jury trial of right. 
t preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by 
ution or as given by statute shall be preserved to 
2nd. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any 
e of right by a jury by paying the statutory jury fee 
g upon the other parties a demand therefor in 
iny time after the commencement of the action and 
lan 10 days after the service of the last pleading 
such issue. Such demand may be endorsed upon a 
the party. 
• specification of issues. In his demand a party may 
Lssues which he wishes so tried; otherwise he shall 
,o have demanded trial by jury for all the issues so 
e has demanded trial by jury for only some of the 
other party, within 10 days after service of the 
iuch lesser time as the court may order, may serve 
>r trial by jury of any other or all of the issues of 
ction. 
i The failure of a party to pay the statutory fee, to 
land as required by this rule and to file it as 
Rule 5(d) constitutes a waiver by him of trial by 
nd for trial by jury made as herein provided may 
rawn without the consent of the parties. 
Rule 39. Trial by jury or by the court. 
(a) By jury. When trial by jury has been demanded as 
provided in Rule 38, the action shall be designated upon the 
register of actions as a jury action. The trial of all issues so 
demanded shall be by jury, unless 
(a)(1) The parties or their attorneys of record, by written 
stipulation filed with the court or by an oral stipulation made 
in open court and entered in the record, consent to trial by the 
court sitting without a jury, or 
(a)(2) The court upon motion or of its own initiative finds 
that a right of trial by jury of some or all of those issues does 
not exist, or 
(a)(3) Either party to the issue fails to appear at the trial. 
(b) By the court. Issues not demanded for trial by jury as 
provided in Rule 38 shall be tried by the court; but, notwith-
standing the failure of a party to demand a jury in an action in 
which such a demand might have been made of right, the court 
in its discretion upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any 
or all issues. 
(c) Advisory jury and trial by consent. In all actions not 
triable of right by a jury the court upon motion or of its own 
initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury or, with the 
consent of both parties, may order a trial with a jury whose 
verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter 
of right. 
Rule 40. Assignment of cases for trial; continuance. 
(a) Order and precedence. The district courts shall provide 
by rule for the placing of actions upon the trial calendar (1) 
without request of the parties or (2) upon request of a party 
and notice to the other parties or (3) in such other manner as 
the courts may deem expedient. Precedence shall be given to 
actions entitled thereto by statute. 
(b) Postponement of the trial. Upon motion of a party, the 
court may in its discretion, and upon such terms as may be 
just, including the payment of costs occasioned by such post-
ponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon good cause 
shown. If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence 
of evidence, such motion shall also set forth the materiality of 
the evidence expected to be obtained and shall show that due 
diligence has been used to procure it. The court may also 
require the party seeking the continuance to state, upon 
affidavit or under oath, the evidence he expects to obtain, and 
if the adverse party thereupon admits that such evidence 
would be given, and that it may be considered as actually 
given on the trial, or offered and excluded as improper, the 
trial shall not be postponed upon that ground. 
(c) Taking testimony of witnesses present. If required by the 
adverse party, the court shall, as a condition to such postpone-
ment, proceed to have the testimony of any witness present 
taken, in the same manner as if at the trial; and the testimony 
so taken may be read on the trial with the same effect, and 
subject to the same objections that may be made with respect 
to a deposition under the provisions of Rule 32(c)(3)(A) and 
(B). 
Rule 41. Dismissal of actions. 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof 
(a)(1) By plaintiff. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of 
Rule 66(i), and of any applicable statute, an action may be 
dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court by filing a 
notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse 
party of an answer or other response to the complaint permit; 
ted under these rules. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of 
dismissal, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a 
notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the 
merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any 
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court of the United States or of any state an action based on or 
including the same claim. 
(a)(2) By order of court. Unless the plaintiff timely files a 
notice of dismissal under paragraph (1) of this subdivision of 
this rule, an action may only be dismissed at the request of the 
plaintiff on order of the court based either on: 
(a)(2)(i) a stipulation of all of the parties who have ap-
peared in the action; or 
(a)(2)(ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems 
proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant 
prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to 
dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defen-
dant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending 
for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise 
specified m the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is 
without prejudice. 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For" failure of the 
Dlaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any 
)rder of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action 
>r of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an action 
xied by the court without a jury, has completed the presenta-
ion of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to 
>ffer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may 
nove for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the 
aw the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier 
>f the facts may then determine them and render judgment 
tgainst the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment 
intil the close of all the evidence. If the court renders 
udgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall 
nake findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in 
ts order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under 
his subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this 
ule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for 
mproper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates 
s an adjudication upon the merits. 
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
laim. The provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any 
ounterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. A voluntary 
ismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to Paragraph (1) of 
ubdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive 
leading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction 
f evidence at the trial or hearing. 
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who 
as once dismissed an action in any court commences an 
ction based upon or including the same claim against the 
ime defendant, the court may make such order for the 
ayment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may 
eem proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until 
le plaintiff has complied with the order. 
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party. 
hould a party dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, cross-
aim, or third-party claim, pursuant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) 
>ove, after a provisional remedy has been allowed such party, 
Le bond or undertaking filed in support of such provisional 
medy must thereupon be delivered by the court to the 
Iverse party against whom such provisional remedy was 
itained. 
ule 42. Consolidation; separate trials. 
(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a common ques-
>n of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a 
nt hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the 
tions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may 
ike such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend 
avoid unnecessary costs or delay. 
a)(l) A motion to consolidate cases shall be heard by the 
Ige assigned to the first case filed. Notice of a motion to 
isolidate cases shall be given to all parties in each case. The 
order denying or granting the motion shall be filed in each 
case. 
(a)(2) If a motion to consolidate is granted, the case number 
of the first case filed shall be used for all subsequent papers, 
and the case shall be heard by the judge assigned to the first: 
case. The presiding judge may assign the case to another judge 
for good cause. 
(b) Separate trials. The court in furtherance of convenience 
or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any claimj 
cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of ami 
separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claimsj 
counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues. 
Rule 43. Evidence. 
(a) Form. In all trials, the testimony of witnesses shall 1 
taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by 1 
rules, the Utah Rules of Evidence, or a statute of this state., 
evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under 
Utah Rules of Evidence or other rules adopted by the Suprem^ 
Court. 
(b) Evidence on motions. When a motion is based on fa< 
not appearing of record the court may hear the matter < 
affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the i 
may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on i 
testimony or depositions. 
Rule 44. Proof of official record. 
(a) Authentication of copy. An official record or an enia 
therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evident 
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by i 
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his depu 
and in the absence of judicial knowledge or competent \ 
dence, accompanied with a certificate that such officer ha»| 
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is within 1 
United States or within a territory or insular posse 
subject to the dominion of the United States, the cer 
may be made by a judge of a court of record of the distrieg| 
political subdivision in which the record is kept, authenti 
by the seal of the court, or may be made by any public < 
having a seal of office and having official duties in the < 
or political subdivision in which the record is kept, aut] 
cated by the seal of his office. If the office in which the i 
is kept is in a foreign state or country, the certificate i 
made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul ge| 
consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer i 
foreign service of the United States stationed in the fof 
state or country in which the record is kept, and authenti| 
by the seal of his office. 
(b) Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed I 
officer having the custody of an official record or by his de| 
that after diligent search no record or entry of a specified t 
is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied ] 
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence J 
the records of his office contain no such record or entry. 
(c) Other proof. This rule does not prevent the pr 
official records or of entry or lack of entry therein by j 
method authorized by any applicable statute or by the i 
evidence at common law. 
(d) Certified copy of record read in evidence. A copy of I 
official record, or entry therein, in the custody of a pu 
officer of this state, or of the United States, certified by J 
officer having custody thereof, to be a full, true and i 
copy of the original in his custody, may be read in evideno 
an action or proceeding in the courts of this state, in 
manner and with like effect as the original could 
produced. 
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ithout motion or notice order the period enlarged if request 
erefor is made before the expiration of the period originally 
escribed or as extended by a previous order or (2) upon 
otion made after the expiration ofthe specified penod permit 
e act to be done where the failure to act was the result of 
cusable neglect, but it may not extend the time for taking 
y action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), and 
(b), except to the extent and under the conditions stated m 
2m 
c) Unaffected by expiration of term The period of time 
>vided for the doing of any act or the taking of any 
needing is not affected or limited by the continued exis-
ce or expiration of a term of court The continued existence 
expiration of a term of court m no way affects the power of 
)urt to do any act or take any proceeding m any civil action 
t has been pending before it 
1) Notice of hearings Notice of a hearing shall be served 
later than 5 days before the time specified for the hearing, 
3ss a different period is fixed by these rules or by order of 
court Such an order may for cause shown be made on ex 
,e application 
) Additional time after service by mail Whenever a party 
the right or is required to do some act or take some 
eedmgs within a prescribed period after the service of a 
*e or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is 
ed upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the end of 
prescribed period as calculated under subsection (a) 
rdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be included in 
•omputation of any 3-day period under this subsection, 
)t that if the last day ofthe 3-day penod is a Saturday, a 
ay, or a legal holiday, the period shall run until the end of 
ext day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday 
kRT III. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS 
7. Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda, hear-
s, orders, objection to commissioner's order. 
Pleadings There shall be a complaint and an answer, a 
to a counterclaim, an answer to a cross-claim, if the 
r contains a cross-claim, a third-party complaint, if a 
who was not an original party is summoned under the 
tons of Rule 14, and a third-party answer, if a third-
•omplaint is served No other pleading shall be allowed, 
that the court may order a reply to an answer or a 
arty answer 
Motions An application to the court for an order shall be 
ion which, unless made during a hearing or tnal or m 
lings before a court commissioner, shall be made m 
nee with this rule A motion shall be m writing and 
lccmctl} and with particulanty the relief sought and 
i ids for the relief sought 
emoranda 
Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times All mo-
cept uncontested or ex parte motions, shall be accom-
)v a supporting memorandum Within ten days after 
)f the motion and supporting memorandum, a party 
r
 the motion shall file a memorandum in opposition 
tve days after service of the memorandum in opposi-
movmg party may file a reply memorandum, which 
united to rebuttal of matters raised in the memoran-
)pposition No other memoranda will be considered 
eave of court A party may attach a proposed order to 
memorandum 
<ength Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages 
ent without leave of the court Reply memoranda 
exceed 5 pages of argument without leave of the 
rt may permit a party to file an over-length memo-
tpon ex parte application and a showing of good 
(c)(3) Content 
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary 
judgment shall contain a statement of matenal facts as to 
which the moving party contends no genuine issue exists 
Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and 
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits 
or discovery matenals Each fact set forth in the moving 
party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of 
summary judgment unless controverted by the responding 
party 
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary 
judgment shall contain a verbatim restatement of each ofthe 
moving party's facts that is controverted, and may contain a 
separate statement of additional facts m dispute For each of 
the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing 
party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any 
dispute, supported by citation to relevant matenals, such as 
affidavits or discovery matenals For any additional facts set 
forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be sepa-
rately stated and numbered and supported by citation to 
supporting matenals, such as affidavits or discovery maten-
als 
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argu-
ment shall contain a table of contents and a table of authon-
ties with page references 
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum 
relevant portions of documents cited in the memorandum, 
such as affidavits or discovery materials 
(d) Request to submit for decision When briefing is com-
plete, either party may file a "Request to Submit for Decision " 
The request to submit for decision shall state the date on 
which the motion was served, the date the opposing memo-
randum, if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, 
if any, was served, and whether a heanng has been requested 
If no party files a request, the motion will not be submitted for 
decision 
(e) Hearings The court may hold a hearing on any motion 
A party may request a heanng in the motion in a memoran-
dum or in the request to submit for decision A request for 
heanng shall be separately identified in the caption of the 
document containing the request The court shall grant a 
request for a heanng on a motion under Rule 56 or a motion 
that would dispose ofthe action or any claim or defense in the 
action unless the court finds that the motion or opposition to 
the motion is frivolous or the issue has been authontatively 
decided 
(f) Orders 
(f)(1) An order includes every direction ofthe court, includ-
ing a minute order entered in writing, not included in a 
judgment An order for the payment of money may be enforced 
m the same manner as if it were a judgment Except as 
otherwise provided by these rules, any order made without 
notice to the adverse party may be vacated or modified by the 
judge who made it with or without notice Orders shall state 
whether they are entered upon tnal, stipulation, motion or the 
court's initiative 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submit-
ted with an initial memorandum, or unless otherwise directed 
by the court, the prevailing party shall, within fifteen days 
after the court's decision, serve upon the other parties a 
pioposed order in conformity with the court's decision Objec-
tions to the proposed order shall be filed within five days after 
service The party preparing the order shall file the proposed 
order upon being served with an objection or upon expiration 
of the time to object 
(g) Objection to court coinmissionei 's iecommendatwn A 
recommendation of a court commissioner is the order of the 
court until modified by the court A party may object to the 
recommendation by filing an objection in the same manner as 
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78-14-9. Professional l iabi l i ty insurance coverage for 
providers — Insurance commissioner may re-
quire jo int underwr i t ing authority. 
If the commissioner finds after a hearing that in any part of 
this state any professional liability insurance coverage for 
health care providers is not readily available in the voluntary 
market, and that the public interest requires, he may by 
regulation promulgate and implement plans to provide insur-
ance coverage through all insurers issuing professional liabil-
ity policies and individual and group accident and sickness 
policies providing medical, surgical or hospital expense cover-
age on either a prepaid or an expense incurred basis, including 
personal injury protection and medical expense coverage is-
sued incidental to liability insurance policies. 1976 
78-14-9.5. Per iodic p a y m e n t of future damages in mal-
pract ice act ions . 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Future damages" means a judgment creditor's 
damages for future medical treatment, care or custody, 
loss of future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future 
pain and suffering. 
(b) "Periodic payments" means the payment of money 
or delivery of other property to the judgment creditor at 
such intervals as ordered by the court. 
(2) In any malpractice action against a health care provider, 
as defined in Section 78-14-3, the court shall, at the request of 
any party, order that future damages which equal or exceed 
$100,000, less amounts payable for attorney's fees and other 
costs which are due at the time of judgment, shall be paid by 
periodic payments rather than by a lump sum payment. 
(3) In rendering a judgment which orders the payment of 
future damages by periodic payments, the court shall order 
periodic payments to provide a fair correlation between the 
sustaining of losses and the payment of damages. Lost future 
earnings shall be paid over the judgment creditor's work life 
expectancy. The court shall also order, when appropriate, that 
periodic payments increase at a fixed rate, equal to the rate of 
inflation which the finder of fact used to determine the amount 
of future damages, or as measured by the most recent Con-
sumer Price Index applicable to Utah for all goods and 
services. The present cash value of all periodic payments shall 
equal the fact finder's award of future damages, less any 
amount paid for attorney's fees and costs. The present cash 
value of periodic payments shall be determined by discounting 
the total amount of periodic payments projected over the 
judgment creditor's life expectancy, by the rate of interest 
which the finder of fact used to reduce the amount of future 
damages to present value, or the rate of interest available at 
the time of trial on one year U.S. Government Treasury Bills. 
Before periodic payments of future damages may be ordered, 
the court shall require a judgment debtor to post security 
which assures full payment of those damages. Security for 
payment of a judgment of periodic payments may be in one or 
more of the following forms: 
(a) a bond executed by a qualified insurer; 
<ij)nan~aTinuityxontract executed by^-qualified4nsurer;— 
(c) evidence of applicable and collectable liability insur-
ance with one or more qualified insurers; 
(d) an agreement by one or more qualified insurers to 
guarantee payment of the judgment; or 
(e) any other form of security approved by the court. 
Security which complies with this section may also serve as 
a supersedeas bond, where one is required. 
(4) A judgment which orders payment of future damages by 
periodic payments shall specify the recipient or recipients of 
the payments, the dollar amount of the payments, the interval 
between payments, and the number of payments or the period 
of time over which payments shall be made. Those payments 
may only be modified in the event of the death of the judgment 
creditor. 
(5) If the court finds that the judgment debtor, or the 
assignee of his obligation to make periodic payments, has 
failed to make periodic payments as ordered by the court, it 
shall, in addition to the required periodic payments, order the 
judgment debtor or his assignee to pay the judgment creditor 
all damages caused by the failure to make payments, includ-
ing court costs and attorney's fees. 
(6) The obligation to make periodic payments for all future 
damages, other than damages for loss of future earnings, shall 
cease upon the death of the judgment creditor. Damages 
awarded for loss of future earnings shall not be reduced or 
payments terminated by reason of the death of the judgment 
creditor, but shall be paid to persons to whom the judgment 
creditor owed a duty of support, as provided by law, immedi-
ately prior to his death. In that case the court which rendered 
the original judgment may, upon petition of any party in 
interest, modify the judgment to award and apportion the 
unpaid future damages in accordance with this section. *J 
(7) If security is posted in accordance with Subsection (3^ 
and approved by a final judgment entered under this sectioxi| 
the judgment is considered to be satisfied, and the judgment 
debtor on whose behalf the security is posted shall be dial 
charged. i9si 
78-14-10. Actions under Utah Governmental Imm 
Act. 
The provisions of this act shall apply to malpractice actw 
against health care providers which are brought under 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act insofar as they are apj 
cable; provided, however, that this act shall in no way 
the requirements for filing notices of claims, times for 
mencing actions and limitations on amounts recoverable 
der the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
78-14-11. Act not retroactive — Exception. 
The provisions of this act, with the exception of the} 
sions relating to the limitation on the time for comme 
action, shall not apply to injuries, death or services ] 
which occurred prior to the effective date of this act. 
affec 
78-14-12. Division to provide panel — Exempt! 
Procedures — Statute of limitations toD 
Composition of panel — Expenses — Div 
authorized to set license fees. 
(1) (a) The division shall provide a hearing panel in | 
medical liability cases against health care pr 
defined in Section 78-14-3, except dentists, 
(b) (i) The division shall establish proceduresj 
litigation consideration of medical liability c 
damages arising out of the provision of < 
failure to provide health care. 
(ii) The division may establish rules ne 
administer the process and procedures rel 
prelitigation hearings and the conduct of j 
through 78-14-16. 
(c) The proceedings are informal, nonbind 
not subject to Title 63, Chapter 46b, Ad 
Procedures Act, but are compulsory as a conj 
dent to commencing litigation. 
(d) Proceedings conducted under authority! 
tion are confidential, privileged, and immu 
process. 
(2) (a) The party initiating a medical liability 
file a request for prelitigation panel 
division within 60 days after the service < 
notice of intent to commence action under I 
revie: 
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b) The request shall include a copy of the notice of 
ent to commence action. The request shall be mailed to 
health care providers named in the notice and request, 
i) The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review 
der this section tolls the applicable statute of limita-
ris until the earlier of 60 days following the division's 
uance of an opinion by the prelitigation panel, or 60 
fs following the termination of jurisdiction by the 
ision as provided in this subsection. The division shall 
id any opinion issued by the panel to all parties by 
ular mail. 
b) (i) The division shall complete a prelitigation hear-
ing under this section within 180 days after the filing 
of the request for prelitigation panel review, or within 
any longer period as agreed upon in writing by all 
parties to the review. 
(ii) If the prelitigation hearing has not been com-
pleted within the time limits established in Subsec-
tion (3)(b)(i), the division has no further jurisdiction 
over the matter subject to review and the claimant is 
considered to have complied with all conditions prec-
edent required under tins section prior to the com-
mencement of litigation. 
i) (i) The claimant and any respondent may agree by 
written stipulation that no useful purpose would be 
served by convening a prelitigation panel under this 
section. 
(ii) When the stipulation is filed with the division, 
the division shall within ten days after receipt enter 
an order divesting itself of jurisdiction over the claim, 
as it concerns the stipulating respondent, and stating 
that the claimant has complied with all conditions 
precedent to the commencement of litigation regard-
ing the claim. 
tie division shall provide for and appoint an appropri-
i\ or panels to hear complaints of medical liability and 
s, made by or on behalf of any patient who is an 
victim of medical liability. The panels are composed of: 
0 one member who is a resident lawyer currently 
used and in good standing to practice law in this state 
who shall serve as chairman of the panel, who is 
ointed by the division from among qualified individu-
who have registered with the division indicating a 
ingness to serve as panel members, and a willingness 
>mply with the rules of professional conduct governing 
yrers in the state of Utah, and who has completed 
sion training regarding conduct of panel hearings; 
) (i) one member who is a licensed health care pro-
vider listed under Section 78-14-3, who is practicing 
and knowledgeable in the same specialty as the 
proposed defendant, and who is appointed by the 
division in accordance with Subsection (5); or 
(ii) in claims against only hospitals or their em-
ployees, one member who is an individual currently 
serving in a hospital administration position directly 
related to hospital operations or conduct that in-
cludes responsibility for the area of practice that is 
the subject of the liability claim, and who is appointed 
by the division; and 
a lay panelist who is not a lawyer, doctor, hospital 
loyee, or other health care provider, and who is a 
Dnsible citizen of the state, selected and appointed by 
livision from among individuals who have completed 
ion training with respect to panel hearings. 
Each person listed as a health care provider in 
on 78-14-3 and practicing under a license issued by 
state, is obligated as a condition of holding that 
se to participate as a member of a medical liability 
ligation panel at reasonable times, places, and inter-
vals, upon issuance, with advance notice given in a 
reasonable time frame, by the division of an Order to 
Participate as a Medical Liability Prelitigation Panel 
Member. 
(b) A licensee may be excused from appearance and 
participation as a panel member upon the division finding 
participation by the licensee will create an unreasonable 
burden or hardship upon the licensee. 
(c) A licensee whom the division finds failed to appear 
and participate as a panel member when so ordered, 
without adequate explanation or justification and without 
being excused for cause by the division, may be assessed 
an adniinistrative fine not to exceed $5,000. 
(d) A licensee whom the division finds intentionally or 
repeatedly failed to appear and participate as a panel 
member when so ordered, without adequate explanation 
or justification and without being excused for cause by the 
division, may be assessed an administrative fine not to 
exceed $5,000, and is guilty of unprofessional conduct. 
(e) All fines collected under Subsections (5Xc) and (d) 
shall be deposited in the Physicians Education Fund 
created in Section 58-67a-l. 
(6) Each person selected as a panel member shall certify, 
under oath, that he has no bias or conflict of interest with 
respect to any matter under consideration. 
(7) Members of the prelitigation hearing panels shall re-
ceive per diem compensation and travel expenses for attend-
ing panel hearings as established by rules of the division. 
(8) (a) In addition to the actual cost of administering the 
licensure of health care providers, the division may set 
license fees of health care providers within the limits 
established by law equal to their proportionate costs of 
administering prelitigation panels. 
(b) The claimant bears none of the costs of administer-
ing the prelitigation panel except under Section 78-14-16. 
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78-14-13. Proceedings — Authority of panel — Rights 
of parties to proceedings. 
(1) No record of the proceedings is required and all evi-
dence, documents, and exhibits are returned to the parties or 
witnesses who provided the evidence, documents, and exhibits 
at the end of the proceedings upon the request of the parties or 
witnesses who provided the evidence. 
(2) The division may issue subpoenas for medical records 
directly related to the claim of medical liability in accordance 
with division rule and in compliance with the following: 
(a) the subpoena shall be prepared by the requesting 
party in proper form for issuance by the division; and 
(b) the subpoena shall be accompanied by. 
(i) an affidavit prepared by the person requesting 
the subpoena attesting to the fact the medical record 
subject to subpoena is believed to be directly related 
to the medical liability claim to which the subpoena is 
related; or 
(ii) by a written release for the medical records to 
be provided to the person requesting the subpoena, 
signed by the individual who is the subject of the 
medical record or by that individual's guardian or 
conservator. 
(3) Per diem reimbursement to panel members and ex-
penses incurred by the panel in the conduct of prelitigation 
panel hearings shall be paid by the division. Expenses related 
to subpoenas are paid by the requesting party, including 
witness fees and mileage. 
(4) The proceedings are informal and formal rules of evi-
dence are not applicable. There is no discovery or perpetuation 
of testimony in the proceedings, except upon special order of 
the panel, and for good cause shown demonstrating extraor-
dinary circumstances. 
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78-12-39. Effect of war. 
When a person is an alien subject or a citizen of a country at 
war with the United States, the time of the continuance of the 
war is not a part of the period limited for the commencement 
of the action. 1963 
78-12-40. Effect of fai lure of act ion not on merits. 
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment 
thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in 
such action or upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the 
merits, and the time limited either by law or contract for 
commencmg the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he 
dies and the cause of action survives, his representatives, may 
commence a new action within one year after the reversal or 
failure. 1953 
78-12-41. Effect of injunct ion or prohibit ion. 
When the commencement of an action is stayed by injunc-
tion or a statutory prohibition the time of the continuance of 
the injunction or prohibition is not part of the time limited for 
the commencement of the action. 1953 
78-12-42. Disabil i ty m u s t ex is t w h e n right of act ion 
accrues. 
No person can avail himself of a disability, unless it existed 
when his right of action accrued. 1953 
78-12-43. All disabi l i t ies must b e removed. 
When two or more disabilities coexist at the tune the right 
of action accrues, the limitation does not attach until all are 
removed. 1953 
78-12-44. Effect of payment , acknowledgment , or 
promise to pay. 
In any case founded on contract, when any part of the 
principal or interest shall have been paid, or an acknowledg-
ment of an existing liability, debt or claim, or any promise to 
pay the same, shall have been made, an action may be brought 
within the period prescribed for the same after such payment, 
acknowledgment or promise; but such acknowledgment or 
promise must be in writing, signed by the party to be charged 
thereby. When a right of action is barred by the provisions of 
any statute, it shall be unavailable either as a cause of action 
or ground of defense. 1953 
78-12-45. Act ion barred i n another state barred here . 
When a cause of action has arisen in another state or 
territory, or in a foreign country, and by the laws thereof an 
action thereon cannot there be maintained against a person by 
reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon shall not be 
maintained against him in this state, except in favor of one 
who has been a citizen of this state and who has held the cause 
of action from the time it accrued. 1953 
78-12-46. "Action" inc ludes special proceeding. 
The word "action," as used in this chapter, is to be construed, 
whenever it is necessary to do so, as including a special 
proceeding of a civil nature. 1953 
78-12-47. Separate trial of s tatute of l imitat ions i s sue 
in malpractice actions. 
In any action against a physician and surgeon, dentist, 
osteopathic physician, chiropractor, physical therapist, regis-
tered nurse, clinical laboratory bioanalyst, clinical laboratory 
technologist, or a licensed hospital, person, firm or corporation 
as the employer of any such person for professional negligence 
or for rendering professional services without consent, if the 
responsive pleading of the defendant pleads that the action is 
barred by the statute of limitations, and if either party so 
moves the court, the issue raised thereby may be tried 
separately and before any other issues in the case are tried. If 
the issue raised by the defense of the statute of limitations is 
finally determined in favor of the plaintiff, the 
issues shall then be tried. 
This act shall not be construed to be retroactive. 
78-12-48. Statute of limitations — Asbestos < ___ 
(1) (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of 
statute of limitation or repose may bar an _ 
recover damages from any manufacturer of any coj-L 
tion materials containing asbestos and arising outS 
manufacturer's providing of the materials, directf 
through other persons, for use in construction1^ 
building within the state until July 1, 1991, or untL 
years after the person or entity bringing theV|t 
discovers or with reasonable diligence could haveH 
ered the injury or damages, whichever i s later.'7 
(b) Subsection (a) provides a statute of limits, 
the specified actions, and also acts retroactively to t 
within time limits, the commencement of actions^ 
this section that are otherwise barred. 
(2) As used in this section, "asbestos" means asb 
varieties of: 
(a) chrysotile (serpentine); 
(b) crocidolite (riebeckite); 
(c) amosite (cummingtonite-grunerite); 
(d) anthophyllite; 
(e) tremolite; or 
(f) actinolite. 
CHAPTER 12a 
PROCESS SERVER ACT 
Section 
78-12a-l. 
78-12a-2. 
78-12a-3. 
78-12a-4. 
Short title. 
Process servers. 
Recoverable rates. 
Violations of service of process aui 
78-12a-l. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Process Server Acfc£ 
78-12a-2. Process servers. 
(1) Persons who are not peace officers, constabl 
or lawfully appointed deputies of such officers*, or ^ 
state investigators may not serve any forms of civil oa 
process other than complaints, summonses, and si 
(2) The following persons may serve all p] 
the courts of this state except as otherwise limii 
tion (1): 
(a) a peace officer employed by any political 
of the state actmg within the scope and j 
employment; 
(b) a sheriff or appointed deputy sheriff 
any county of the state; 
(c) a constable serving in compliance wij 
law; ~~~ 
(d) an investigator employed by the si 
rized by law to serve civil process. 
(3) Private investigators licensed in acco] 
53, Chapter 9, Private Investigator Regulation 
serve the following forms of process: 
(a) petitions; 
(b) complaints; 
(c) summonses; 
(d) supplemental orders; 
(e) orders to show cause; 
(f) notices; 
(g) small claims affidavits; 
(h) small claims orders; 
(i) writs of garnishment; 
